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Abstract. We develop a general, non-probabilistic model of prediction
which is suitable for assessing the (un)predictability of individual phys-
ical events. We use this model to provide, for the first time, a rigorous
proof of the unpredictability of a class of individual quantum measure-
ment outcomes, a well-known quantum attribute postulated or claimed
for a long time.
We prove that quantum indeterminism—formally modelled as value
indefiniteness—is incompatible with the supposition of predictability:
measurements of value indefinite observables are unpredictable. The proof
makes essential use of a strengthened form of the Kochen-Specker theo-
rem proven previously to identify value indefinite observables. This form
of quantum unpredictability, like the Kochen-Specker theorem, relies on
three assumptions: compatibility with quantum mechanical predictions,
non-contextuality, and the value definiteness of observables correspond-
ing to the preparation basis of a quantum state.
We explore the relation between unpredictability and incomputability
and show that the unpredictability of individual measurements of a value
indefinite quantum observable complements, and is independent of, the
global strong incomputability of any sequence of outcomes of this par-
ticular quantum experiment.
Finally, we discuss a real model of hypercomputation whose computa-
tional power has yet to be determined, as well as further open problems.
1 Introduction
The outcomes of measurements on a quantum systems are often regarded to be
fundamentally unpredictable [33]. However, such claims are based on intuition
and experimental evidence, rather than precise mathematical reasoning. In order
to investigate this view more precisely, both the notion of unpredictability and
the status of quantum measurements relative to such a notion need to be carefully
studied.
Unpredictability is difficult to formalise not just in the setting of quantum
mechanics, but that of classical mechanics too. Various physical processes from
classical chaotic systems to quantum measurement outcomes are often considered
unpredictable, and various definitions, both domain specific [30] or more general
[13], and of varying formality, have been proposed. For precise claims to be made,
the appropriate definitions need to be scrutinised and the results proven relative
to specific definitions.
Quantum indeterminism has been progressively formalised via the notion of
value indefiniteness in the development of the theorems of Bell [5] and, par-
ticularly, Kochen and Specker [16]. These theorems, which have also been ex-
perimentally tested via the violation of various inequalities [29], express the
impossibility of certain classes of deterministic theories. The conclusion of value
indefiniteness from these no-go theorems rests on various assumptions, amount-
ing to the refusal to accept non-classical alternatives such as non-locality and
contextual determinism. And if value indefiniteness is, as often stated, related
to unpredictability, any claims of unpredictability need to be similarly evaluated
with respect to, and seen to be contingent on such assumptions.
In this paper we address these issues in turn. We first discuss various existing
notions of predictability and their applicability to physical events. We propose
a new formal model of prediction which is non-probabilistic and, we argue, cap-
tures the notion that an arbitrary single physical event (be it classical, quan-
tum, or otherwise) or sequence thereof is ‘in principle’ predictable. We review
the formalism of value indefiniteness and the assumptions of the Kochen-Specker
theorems (classical and stronger forms), and show that the outcomes of measure-
ments of value indefinite properties are indeed unpredictable with respect to our
model. Thus, in this framework unpredictability rests on the same assumptions
as quantum value indefiniteness. Finally, we discuss the relationship between
quantum randomness and unpredictability, and show that unpredictability does
not, in general, imply the incomputability of sequences generated by repeating
the experiment ad infinitum. Thus, the strong incomputability of sequences of
quantum measurement outcomes appears to rest independently on the assump-
tion of value indefiniteness.
2 Models of prediction
To predict—in Latin prædicere, “to say before”—means to forecast what will
happen under specific conditions before the phenomenon happens. Various defi-
nitions of predictability proposed by different authors will be discussed regarding
their suitability for capturing the notion of predictability of individual physical
events or sequences thereof in the most general sense. While some papers, par-
ticularly in physics and cryptographic fields, seem to adopt the view that proba-
bilities mean unpredictability [4,33], this is insufficient to describe unpredictable
physical processes. Probabilities are a formal description given by a particular
theory, but do not entail that a physical process is fundamentally, that is, on-
tologically, indeterministic nor unpredictable, and can (often very reasonably)
represent simply an epistemic lack of knowledge or underdetermination of the
theory. Instead, a more robust way to formulate prediction seems to be in terms
of a ‘predicting agent’ of some form. This is indeed the approach taken by some
definitions, and that we also will follow.
In the theory of dynamical systems, unpredictability has long been linked
to chaos and has often been identified as the inability to calculate with any
reasonable precision the state of a system given a particular observable initial
condition [30]. The observability is critical, since although a system may presum-
ably have a well-defined initial state (a point in phase-space), any observation
yields an interval of positive measure (a region of phase space). This certainly
seems the correct path to follow in formalising predictability, but more generality
and formalism is needed to provide a definition for arbitrary physical processes.
Popper, in arguing that unpredictability is indeterminism, defines predic-
tion in terms of “physical predicting machines” [21]. He considers these as real
machines that can take measurements of the world around them, compute via
physical means, and output (via some display or tape, for example) predictions
of the future state of the system. He then studies experiments which must be
predicted with a certain accuracy and considers these to be predictable if it is
physically possible to construct a predictor for them.
Wolpert [31] formalised this notion much further in developing a general ab-
stract model of physical inference. Like Popper, Wolpert was interested in inves-
tigating the limits of inference, including prediction, arising from the simple fact
that any inference device must itself be a physical device, hence an object whose
behaviour we can try to predict. While Wolpert’s aim was not so focused on the
predictability arising from the nature of specific physical theories, he identified
and formalised the need for an experimenter to develop prediction techniques
and initialise them by interacting with the environment via measurements.
A more modern and technical definition of unpredictability was given by Ea-
gle [13] in defining randomness as maximal unpredictability. While we will return
to the issue of randomness later, Eagle’s definition of unpredictability deserves
further attention. He defined prediction relative to a particular theory and for
a particular predicting agent, an approach thus with some similarity to that
of Wolpert. Specifically, a prediction function is defined as a function mapping
the state of the system described by the theory and specified epistemically (and
thus finitely) by the agent to a probability distribution of states at some time.
This definition formalises more clearly prediction as the output of a function
operating on information extracted about the physical system by an agent.
Popper’s and Wolpert’s notions of predictability perhaps lack generality by
requiring the predictor to be embedded, that is, physically present, in its environ-
ment [28], and are not so suited to investigating the predictability of particular
physical processes, but rather of the physical world as a whole. Similarly, Eagle’s
definition renders predictability relative to a particular physical theory.
In order to relate the intrinsic indeterminism of a system to unpredictability,
it would be more appropriate to have a definition of events as unpredictable in
principle. Thus, the predictor’s ignorance of a better theory might change their
associated epistemic ability to know if an event is predictable or not, but would
not change the fact that an event may or may not be, in principle, predictable.
Last but not least, it is important to restrict the class of prediction functions
by imposing some effectivity (i.e. computability) constraints. Indeed, we suggest
that “to predict” is to say in advance in some effective/constructive/computable
way what physical event or outcome will happen. Thus, motivated by the Church-
Turing Thesis, we choose here Turing computability. Any predicting agent op-
erating with incomputable means—incomputable/infinite inputs or procedures
that can go beyond the the power of algorithms (for example, by executing in-
finitely many operations in a finite amount of time)—seems to be physically
highly speculative if not impossible. Technically, “controlled incomputability”
could be easily incorporated in the model, if necessary.
Taking these points into account, we propose a definition—similar in some
aspects to Wolerpt’s and Eagle’s definitions—based on the ability of some com-
putably operating agent to correctly predict using finite information extracted
from the system of the specified experiment. For simplicity we will consider ex-
periments with binary observable values (0 or 1), but the extension to finitely or
countable many (i.e. finitely specified) output values is straightforward. Further,
unlike Eagle [13], we consider only prediction with certainty, rather than with
probability. While it is not difficult nor unreasonable to extend our definition
to the more general scenario, this is not needed for our application to quantum
measurements; moreover, in doing so we avoid any potential pitfalls related to
probability 1 or 0 events [32].
Our main aim is to define the (correct) prediction of individual events [13],
which can be easily extended to an infinite sequence of events. An individual
event can be correctly predicted simply by chance, and a robust definition of
predictability clearly has to avoid this possibility. Popper succinctly summarises
this predicament in Ref. [21, 117–118]:
“If we assert of an observable event that it is unpredictable we do not
mean, of course, that it is logically or physically impossible for anybody
to give a correct description of the event in question before it has oc-
curred; for it is clearly not impossible that somebody may hit upon such
a description accidentally. What is asserted is that certain rational meth-
ods of prediction break down in certain cases—the methods of prediction
which are practised in physical science.”
One possibility is then to demand a proof that the prediction is correct, thus
formalising the “rational methods of prediction” that Popper refers to. However,
this is notoriously difficult and must be made relative to the physical theory
considered, which generally is not well axiomatised and can change over time.
Instead we demand that such predictions be repeatable, and not merely one-off
events. This point of view is consistent with Popper’s own framework of empirical
falsification [20,22]: an empirical theory (in our case, the prediction) can never be
proven correct, but it can be falsified through decisive experiments pointing to
incorrect predictions. Specifically, we require that the predictions remain correct
in any arbitrarily long (but finite) set of repetitions of the experiment.
3 A model for prediction of individual physical events
In order to formalise our non-probabilistic model of prediction we consider a
hypothetical experiment E specified effectively by an experimenter. We for-
malise the notion of a predictor as an effective (i.e. computational) method
of uniformly producing the outcome of an experiment using finite information
extracted (again, uniformly) from the experimental conditions along with the
specification of the experiment, but independent of the results of the experi-
ments. An experiment will be predictable if any potential sequence of repetitions
(of unbounded, but finite, length) of it can always be predicted correctly by such
a predictor.
In detail, we consider a finitely specified physical experiment E producing a
single bit x ∈ {0, 1} (which, as we previously noted, can readily be generalised).
Such an experiment could, for example, be the measurement of a photon’s polar-
isation after it has passed through a 50-50 polarising beam splitter, or simply the
toss of a physical coin with initial conditions and experimental parameters spec-
ified finitely. Further, with a particular instantiation or trial of E we associate
the parameter λ which fully describes the trial. While λ is not in its entirety
an obtainable quantity, it contains any information that may be pertinent to
prediction and any predictor can have practical access to a finite amount of this
information. In particular this information may be directly associated with the
particular trial of E (e.g. initial conditions or hidden variables) and/or relevant
external factors (e.g. the time, results of previous trials of E). We can view λ
as a resource that one can extract finite information from in order to predict
the outcome of the experiment E. Any such external factors should, however, be
local in the sense of special relativity, as (even if we admit quantum non-locality)
any other information cannot be utilised for the purpose of prediction [17]. We
formalise this in the following.
An extractor is a physical device selecting a finite amount of information
included in λ without altering the experiment E. It can be used by a predicting
agent to examine the experiment and make predictions when the experiment is
performed with parameter λ. Mathematically, an extractor is represented by a
(deterministic) function λ 7→ ξ(λ) ∈ {0, 1}∗ where ξ(λ) is a finite string of bits.
For example, ξ(λ) may be an encoding of the result of the previous instantiation
of E, or the time of day the experiment is performed. As usual, the formal model
is significantly weaker: here, an extractor is a deterministic function which can
be physically implemented without affecting the experimental run of E.
A predictor for E is an algorithm (computable function) PE which halts on
every input and outputs either 0, 1 (cases in which PE has made a prediction),
or “prediction withheld”. We interpret the last form of output as a refrain from
making a prediction. The predictor PE can utilise as input the information ξ(λ)
selected by an extractor encoding relevant information for a particular instanti-
ation of E, but must not disturb or interact with E in any way; that is, it must
be passive.
As we noted earlier, a certain predictor may give the correct output for a trial
of E simply by chance. This may be due not only to a lucky choice of predictor,
but also to the input being chosen by chance to produce the correct output.
Thus, we rather consider the performance of a predictor PE using, as input,
information extracted by a particular fixed extractor. This way we ensure that
PE utilises in ernest information extracted from λ, and we avoid the complication
of deciding under what input we should consider PE ’s correctness.
A predictor PE provides a correct prediction using the extractor ξ for an
instantiation of E with parameter λ if, when taking as input ξ(λ), it outputs 0
or 1 (i.e. it does not refrain from making a prediction) and this output is equal
to x, the result of the experiment.
Let us fix an extractor ξ. The predictor PE is k-correct for ξ if there ex-
ists an n ≥ k such that when E is repeated n times with associated parame-
ters λ1, . . . , λn producing the outputs x1, x2, . . . , xn, PE outputs the sequence
PE(ξ(λ1)), PE(ξ(λ2)), . . . , PE(ξ(λn)) with the following two properties:
1. no prediction in the sequence is incorrect, and
2. in the sequence there are k correct predictions.
The repetition of E must follow an algorithmic procedure for resetting and re-
peating the experiment; generally this will consist of a succession of events of
the form “E is prepared, performed, the result (if any) recorded, E is reset”.
If PE is k-correct for ξ we can bound the probability that PE is in fact oper-
ating by chance and may not continue to give correct predictions, and thus give
a measure of our confidence in the predictions of PE . Specifically, the sequence
of n predictions made by PE can be represented as a string of length n over
the alphabet {T, F,W}, where T represents a correct prediction, F an incorrect
prediction, and W a withheld prediction. Then, for a predictor that is k-correct
for ξ there exists an n ≥ k such that the sequence of predictions contains k T ’s
and (n − k) W ’s. There are
(
n
k
)
such possible prediction sequences out of 3n
possible strings of length n. Thus, the probability that such a correct sequence
would be produced by chance tends to zero when k goes to infinity because
(
n
k
)
3n
<
2n
3n
≤
(
2
3
)k
.
Clearly the confidence we have in a k-correct predictor increases as k →∞.
If PE is k-correct for ξ for all k, then PE never makes an incorrect prediction
and the number of correct predictions can be made arbitrarily large by repeating
E enough times. In this case, we simply say that PE is correct for ξ. The infin-
ity used in the above definition is potential not actual: its role is to guarantee
arbitrarily many correct predictions.
This definition of correctness allows PE to refrain from predicting when it
is unable to. A predictor PE which is correct for ξ is, when using the extracted
information ξ(λ), guaranteed to always be capable of providing more correct
predictions for E, so it will not output “prediction withheld” indefinitely. Fur-
thermore, although PE is technically used only a finite, but arbitrarily large,
number of times, the definition guarantees that, in the hypothetical scenario
where it is executed infinitely many times, PE will provide infinitely many cor-
rect predictions and not a single incorrect one.
While a predictor’s correctness is based on its performance in repeated trials,
we can use the predictor to define the prediction of single bits produced by the
experiment E. If PE is not correct for ξ then we cannot exclude the possibility
that any correct prediction PE makes is simply due to chance. Hence, we propose
the following definition:
the outcome x of a single trial of the experiment E performed with pa-
rameter λ is predictable (with certainty) if there exist an extractor ξ and
a predictor PE which is correct for ξ, and PE(ξ(λ)) = x.
Accordingly, PE correctly predicts the outcome x, never makes an incorrect
prediction, and can produce arbitrarily many correct predictions.
4 Computability theoretic notions of unpredictability
The notion of unpredictability defined in the previous section has both physical
components (in extracting information from the system for prediction via ξ)
and computability theoretic ones (in predicting via an effective procedure, PE).
Both these components are indispensable for a good model of prediction for
physical systems, but it is nonetheless important to discuss their relation to pure
computability theoretic notions of prediction, since these place unpredictability
in a context where the intuition is stripped to its abstract basics.
The algorithmic notions of bi-immunity (a strong form of incomputability)
and Martin-Lo¨f randomness describe some forms of unpredictability for infinite
sequences of bits [9]. A sequence is bi-immune if it contains no infinite com-
putable subsequence (i.e., both the bits of the subsequence and their positions
in the original sequence must be computable). A sequence is Martin-Lo¨f random
if all prefixes of the sequence cannot be compressed by more than an additive
constant by a universal prefix-free Turing machine (see [9,12] for more details).
Thus, for a bi-immune sequence, we cannot effectively compute the value of any
bit in advance and only finitely many bit-values can be correctly “guessed”, while
a Martin-Lo¨f random sequence contains no “algorithmic” patterns than can be
used to effectively compress it.
However, the notions of predictability presented by Tadaki [27] are perhaps
the most relevant for this discussion. An infinite sequence of bits x = x1x2 . . .
is Tadaki totally predictable if there exists a Turing machine F : {0, 1}∗ →
{0, 1,W} that halts on every input, and satisfies the following two conditions:
(i) for every n, either F (x1 . . . xn) = xn+1 or F (x1 . . . xn) =W ; and (ii) the set
{n ∈ N+ | F (x1 . . . xn) 6=W} is infinite; F is called a total predictor for x.
A similar notion, called Tadaki predictability, requires only that F halts on
all input x1 . . . xn, and thus may be a partially computable function instead of
a computable one. This emphasises that, as we mentioned earlier, the notion of
predictability can be strengthened or weakened by endowing the predictor with
varying computational powers.
Tadaki predictability can be related to various other algorithmic notions of
randomness. For example, no Martin-Lo¨f random sequence is Tadaki (totally)
predictable [27, Theorem 4], while all non-bi-immune sequences are Tadaki totally
predictable. This last fact can be readily proven by noting that a non-bi-immune
sequence x must contain a computable subsequence (k1, xk1), (k2, xk2), . . . .
Equivalently, there is an infinite computable set K ⊂ N and a computable func-
tion f : K → {0, 1} such that for all k ∈ K, f(k) = xk. Hence, for a string
σ ∈ {0, 1}∗ the function
F (σ) =
{
f(|σ|+ 1), if |σ|+ 1 ∈ K,
W, otherwise,
is a Tadaki total predictor for x (|σ| is the length of σ).
Furthermore, the notion of Tadaki total unpredictability is strictly stronger
than bi-immunity, since there exist bi-immune, totally predictable sequences.
For example, let x = x1x2 . . . be a Martin-Lo¨f random sequence (and hence bi-
immune [9]). It is not difficult to show that y = y1y2 · · · = x1x1x2x2 . . . created
by doubling the bits of x is bi-immune. However, y has a Tadaki total predictor
F defined as
F (σ1 . . . σn) =
{
σn, if n is odd,
W, if n is even,
since this correctly predicts the value of every bit at an even position in y.
This notion of predictability can be physically interpreted in the following
way. Consider a black-box B(x) with a button that, when pressed, gives the
next digit of x; by repeating this operation one can slowly learn, in order, the
bits of x. A sequence is Tadaki predictable if there is a uniform way to compute
infinitely often xn+1 having learnt the initial segment x1 . . . xn, with the proviso
that we must know in advance when—that is, the times at which—we will be
able to do so.
When viewed from the physical point of view described above, there is a
clear relation to our notion of predictability. In particular, we can consider a
deterministic experiment Ex that consists of generating a bit from the black-box
B(x), and asking if Ex is predictable for the ‘prefix’ extractor ξp(λi) = x1 . . . xi−1
for the trial of Ex producing xi—that is, using just the results of the previous
repetitions of Ex. It is not too difficult to see that Ex is predictable if and only
if x is Tadaki totally predictable. Indeed, equate the function F from Tadaki’s
definition and the predictor PE , as well as the outputs ‘W ’ and “prediction
withheld”.
In general, algorithmic information theoretical properties of sequences could
be explored using our model of prediction via such an approach. However, the re-
lation between these notions exists only when one considers particular, abstract,
extractors such as ξp. The generality of our model originates in the importance
it affords to physical properties of systems, via extractors, which are essential
for prediction in real systems. Depending on the physical scenario investigated,
then, physical devices might allow us to extract information allowing to predict
an experiment, regardless of the algorithmic content of this information, as long
as finite information suffices for a single prediction.
5 Quantum unpredictability
We now apply the notion developed above to formally justify the well-known
claim that quantum events are completely unpredictable.
5.1 The intuition of quantum indeterminism and unpredictability
Intuitively, it would seem that quantum indeterminism corresponds to the ab-
sence of physical reality; if no unique element of physical reality corresponding
to a particular physical quantity exists, this is reflected by the physical quan-
tity being indeterminate. That is, for such an observable none of the possible
exclusive measurement outcomes are certain to occur and therefore we should
conclude that any kind of prediction of the outcome with certainty cannot exist,
and the outcome of this individual measurement must thus be unpredictable.
For example, an agent trying to predict the outcome of a measurement of a pro-
jection observable in a basis unbiased with respect to the preparation basis (i.e.
if there is a “maximal mismatch” between preparation and measurement) could
do no better than blindly guess the outcome of the measurement.
However, such an argument is too informal. To apply our model of unpre-
dictability the notion of indeterminism needs to be specified much more rigor-
ously: this implies developing a formalism for quantum indeterminism, as well
as a careful discussion of the assumptions which indeterminism is reliant on.
5.2 A formal basis for quantum indeterminism
The phenomenon of quantum indeterminism cannot be deduced from the Hilbert
space formalism of quantum mechanics alone, as this specifies only the proba-
bility distribution for a given measurement which in itself need not indicate
intrinsic indeterminism. Indeterminism has had a role at the heart of quantum
mechanics since Born postulated that the modulus-squared of the wave function
should be interpreted as a probability density that, unlike in classical statistical
physics [18], expresses fundamental, irreducible indeterminism [7]. In Born’s own
words, “I myself am inclined to give up determinism in the world of atoms.” The
nature of individual measurement outcomes in quantum mechanics was, for a pe-
riod, a subject of much debate. Einstein famously dissented, stating his belief
that [8, p. 204] “He does not throw dice.” Nonetheless, over time the conjec-
ture that measurement outcomes are themselves fundamentally indeterministic
became the quantum orthodoxy [33].
Beyond the blind belief originating with Born, the Kochen-Specker theorem,
along with Bell’s theorem, are among the primary reasons for the general ac-
ceptance of quantum indeterminism. The belief in quantum indeterminism thus
rests largely on the same assumptions as these theorems. In the development
of the Kochen-Specker theorem, quantum indeterminism has been formalised as
the notion of value indefiniteness [1], which allows us to discuss indeterminism in
a more general formal setting rather than restricting ourselves to any particular
interpretation. Here we will review this formalism, as well as a stronger form of
the Kochen-Specker theorem and its assumptions which are important for the
discussion of unpredictability.
For a given quantum system in a particular state, we say that an observable is
value definite if the measurement of that observable is pre-determined to take a
(potentially hidden) value. If no such pre-determined value exists, the observable
is value indefinite. Formally, this notion can be represented by a (partial) value
assignment function (see [1] for the complete formalism).
In addressing the question of when we should conclude that a physical quan-
tity is value definite, Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (EPR) give a sufficient cri-
terion of physical reality in terms of certainty and predictability in [14, p. 777].
Based on this accepted sufficient condition for the existence of an element of
physical reality, we allow ourselves to be guided by the following “EPR princi-
ple”:4
EPR principle: If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict
with certainty the value of a physical quantity, then there exists a definite
value prior to observation corresponding to this physical quantity.
As we discussed earlier, the notion of prediction the EPR principle refers to
needs to be effective; further, we note that the constraint that prediction acts
“without in any way disturbing a system” is perhaps non-trivial [17], but is
equally required by our model of prediction.
The EPR principle justifies the subtle but often overlooked
Eigenstate principle: If a quantum system is prepared in a state |ψ〉, then
the projection observable Pψ = |ψ〉〈ψ| is value definite.
This principle is necessary in order to use the strong Kochen-Specker theorem
to single-out value indefinite observables, and is similar to, although weaker,
than the eigenstate-eigenvalue link (as only one direction of the implication is
asserted) [25].
A further requirement called admissibility is used to avoid outcomes impos-
sible to obtain according to quantum predictions. Formally, admissibility states
that an observable in a context—that is, a set of mutually commuting (i.e. com-
patible) observables—cannot be value indefinite if all but one of the possible
measurement outcomes would contradict quantum mechanical identities given
the values of other, value definite observables in the same context. In such a
case, the observable must have the definite value of that sole ‘consistent’ mea-
surement outcome.
4 They continue: “It seems to us that this criterion, while far from exhausting all
possible ways of recognizing a physical reality, at least provides us with one such
way, whenever the conditions set down in it occur.”
Here is an example: given a context {P1, . . . , Pn} of commuting projection
observables, if P1 were to have the definite value 1, all other observables in this
context must have the value 0. Were this not the case, there would be a possibility
to obtain the value 1 for more than one compatible projection observable, a direct
contradiction of the quantum prediction that one and only one projector in a
context give the value 1 on measurement. Note that we require this to hold
only when any indeterminism (which implies multiple possible outcomes) would
allow quantum mechanical predictions to be broken: were P1 to have the value
0, admissibility would not require anything of the other observables if the rest
were value indefinite, as neither a measurement outcome of 0 or 1 for P2 . . . Pn
would lead to a contradiction.
The Kochen-Specker theorem [16] shows that no value assignment function
can consistently make all observables value definite while maintaining the re-
quirement that the values are assigned non-contextually—that is, the value of
an observable is the same in each context it is in. This is a global property: non-
contextuality is incompatible with all observables being value definite. However,
it is possible to go deeper and localise value indefiniteness to prove that even
the existence of two non-compatible value definite observables is in contradic-
tion with admissibility and the requirement that any value definite observables
behave non-contextually, without requiring that all observables be value defi-
nite. Thus, any mismatch between preparation and measurement context leads
to the measurement of a value indefinite observable: this is stated formally in
the following strong version of the Kochen-Specker theorem.
Theorem 1 (From [1,3]). Let there be a quantum system prepared in the state
|ψ〉 in dimension n ≥ 3 Hilbert space Cn, and let |φ〉 be any state neither or-
thogonal nor parallel to |ψ〉, i.e. 0 < |〈ψ|φ〉| < 1. Then the projection observable
Pφ = |φ〉 〈φ| is value indefinite under any non-contextual, admissible value as-
signment.
Hence, accepting that definite values, should they exist for certain observ-
ables, behave non-contextually is in fact enough to derive rather than postulate
quantum value indefiniteness.
5.3 Contextual alternatives
It is worth keeping in mind that, while indeterminism is often treated as an as-
sumption or aspect of the orthodox viewpoint [7,33], this usually rests implicitly
on the deeper assumptions (mentioned in Sect. 5.2) that the Kochen-Specker the-
orem relies on. If these assumptions are violated, deterministic theories could not
be excluded, and the status of value indefiniteness and unpredictability would
need to be carefully revisited.
If this were the case, perhaps the simplest alternative would be the explicit
assumption of (albeit non-local) context dependant predetermined values. Many
attempts to interpret quantum mechanics deterministically, such as Bohmian
mechanics [6], can be expressed in this framework. Since such a theory would
no longer be indeterministic, the intuitive argument for unpredictability would
break down, and the theory could in fact be totally predictable. However, pre-
dictability is still not an immediate consequence, as such hidden variables could
potentially be “assigned” by a demon operating beyond the limits of any pre-
dicting agent (e.g. incomputably).
Another possibility would be to consider the case that any predetermined
outcomes may in fact not be determined by the observable alone, but rather by
“the complete disposition of the apparatus” [5, Sec. 5]. In this viewpoint, even
when the macroscopic measurement apparatuses are still idealised as being per-
fect, their many degrees of freedom (which may by far exceed Avogadro’s or
Loschmidt’s constants) contribute to any measurement of the single quantum.
Most of these degrees of freedom might be totally uncontrollable by the experi-
menter, and may result in an epistemic unpredictability which is dominated by
the combined complexities of interactions between the single quantum measured
and the (macroscopic) measurement device producing the outcome.
In such a measurement, the pure single quantum and the apparatus would
become entangled. In the absence of one-to-one uniqueness between the macro-
scopic states of the measurement apparatus and the quantum, any measurement
would amount to a partial trace resulting in a mixed state of the apparatus,
and thus to uncertainty and unpredictability of the readout. In this case, just
as for irreversibility in classical statistical mechanics [18], the unpredictability of
single quantum measurements might not be irreducible at all, but an expression
of, and relative to, the limited means available to analyse the situation.
5.4 Unpredictability of individual quantum measurements
With the notion of value indefiniteness presented, let us now turn our attention to
applying our formalism of unpredictability to quantum measurement outcomes
of the type discussed in Sect. 5.2.
Throughout this section we will consider an experiment E performed in di-
mension n ≥ 3 Hilbert space in which a quantum system is prepared in a state
|ψ〉 and a value indefinite observable Pφ is measured producing a single bit x.
By Theorem 1 such an observable is guaranteed to exist, and to identify one
we need only a mismatch between preparation and observation contexts. The
nature of the physical system in which this state is prepared and the experiment
performed is not important, whether it be photons passing through generalised
beam splitters [23], ions in an atomic trap, or any other quantum system in
dimension n ≥ 3 Hilbert space.
We first show that experiments utilising quantum value indefinite observers
cannot have a predictor which is correct for some ξ. More precisely:
Theorem 2. If E is an experiment measuring a quantum value indefinite ob-
servable, then for every predictor PE using any extractor ξ, PE is not correct for
ξ.
Let us fix an extractor ξ, and assume for the sake of contradiction that there
exists a predictor PE for E which is correct for ξ. Consider the case when the
experiment E is repeatedly initialised, performed and reset an arbitrarily large
but finite, number of times in an algorithmic “ritual” generating a finite sequence
of bits x1x2 . . . xn.
Since PE never makes an incorrect prediction, each of its predictions is cor-
rect with certainty. Then, according to the EPR principle we must conclude that
each such prediction corresponds to a value definite property of the system mea-
sured in E. However, we chose E such that this is not the case: each xi is the
result of the measurement of a value indefinite observable, and thus we obtain a
contradiction and conclude no such predictor PE can exist.
Moreover, since there does not exist a predictor PE which is correct for some
ξ, for such a quantum experiment E, no single outcome is predictable with
certainty.
Theorem 3. If the experiment E described above is repeated a) an arbitrarily
large, but finite number of times producing the finite sequence x1x2 . . .xn, or b)
hypothetically, ad infinitum, generating the infinite sequence x = x1x2 . . . , then
no single bit xi can be predicted with certainty.
6 Incomputability, unpredictability, and quantum
randomness
While there is a clear intuitive link between unpredictability and randomness, it
is an important point that the unpredictability of quantum measurement out-
comes should not be understood to mean that quantum randomness is “truly
random”. Indeed, the subject of randomness is a delicate one: randomness can
come in many flavours [12], from statistical properties to computability theo-
retic properties of outcome sequences. For physical systems, the randomness of
a process also needs to be differentiated from that of its outcome.
As mentioned earlier, Eagle has argued that a physical process is random if it
is “maximally unpredictable” [13]. In this light it may be reasonable to consider
quantum measurements as random events, giving a more formal meaning to the
notion of “quantum randomness”. However, given the intricacies of randomness,
it should be clear that this refers to the measurement process, and does not
entail that quantum measurement outcomes are maximally random. In fact,
maximal randomness in the sense that no correlations exist between successive
measurement results is mathematically impossible [15,9]: there exist only degrees
of randomness with no upper limit. As a result, any claims regarding the quality
of quantum randomness need to be analysed carefully.
Indeed, in many applications of quantum randomness stronger computabil-
ity theoretic notions of randomness, such as Martin-Lo¨f randomness [9], which
apply to sequences of outcomes would be desirable. It is not known if quantum
outcomes are indeed random in this respect. However, it was shown previously
[10,1] that a sequence x produced by repeated outcomes of a value indefinite ob-
servable must be bi-immune.5 This result was proved using a further physical
5 See Sect. 4 for definitions.
assumption, related to and motivated by the EPR principle, called the e.p.r.
assumption.6 This assumption states that, if a repetition of measurements of an
observable generates a computable sequence, then this implies these observables
were value definite prior to measurement. In other words, it specifies a particular
sufficient condition for value definiteness.
Given the relation between unpredictability and Tadaki total unpredictabil-
ity (which implies bi-immunity) discussed in Sect. 4, it is natural to ask whether
the bi-immunity of sequences generated by measuring repeatedly a value indef-
inite observable is a general consequence of its unpredictability, or if it is an
independent consequence of value indefiniteness.
The links between unpredictability and Tadaki total unpredictability we ex-
plored earlier are relative to the use of specific extractors—such as ξp—and,
as we discussed, need not hold when other more physically relevant extractors
are considered. Furthermore, for the unpredictability of an experiment E to
guarantee that any outcome of an infinite repetition of E be incomputable—a
much weaker statement than bi-immunity—it would have to be the case that
(taking the contrapositive) if even a single infinite repetition λ1, λ2, . . . of E
could generate a computable sequence this would imply that E is predictable.
However, the definition of a predictor PE for E requires that PE gives correct
predictions for all repetitions. Hence, we will elaborate a simple example of
an unpredictable experiment E that can produce both computable and incom-
putable sequences, showing that unpredictability does not imply incomputability
(let alone bi-immunity).
Let d be the dyadic map; that is, the operation on infinite sequences of
bits defined by d(x1x2x3 . . . ) = x2x3 . . . . This operation is well known to be
chaotic and equivalent (more precisely, topologically conjugate) to many others,
e.g. the logistic map with r = 4 [11]. Let us consider an experiment Ed which
involves iterating the dyadic map k ≥ 2 times on a ‘seed’ x = 0x2x3 . . . until
xk+1 = 0. In other words, given x we look for the smallest integer k ≥ 2 such that
xk+1 = 0, hence d
k(x) = 0xk+2xk+3 . . . . If such a k exists, then the outcome
of the experiment is xk+2 ∈ {0, 1}. We assume that such an Ed (ideally) is
physically implementable. We have chosen this example for simplicity; a more
‘physically natural’ example might be the evolution of a chaotic double pendulum
from some set initial condition (up to finite accuracy) for which the outcome is
read off once the pendulum returns sufficiently close to its initial conditions.
This experiment can, of course, be repeated in many different ways to gen-
erate an infinite sequence, but it suffices to consider the simplest case where the
transformed seed x(1) = dk(x) after one iteration is taken as the seed for the
next step; note that this, by design, satisfies the requirement that the first bit
of x(1) is 0 (i.e., x
(1)
1 = 0), provided k exists. Let us assume further that any
sequence x = x1x2 . . . such that x1 = 0 is a valid physical seed. For the case of a
double pendulum this is akin to assuming that the position of a pendulum can
6 Here, e.p.r. stands for ‘elements of physical reality, not ‘Einstein, Podolsky and
Rosen’ as in the EPR principle.’
take any value in the continuum—not an unreasonable, if nonetheless important,
assumption.
Let y = y1y2 . . . be an arbitrary infinite sequence, and consider the sequence
x = 010y10y20y3 . . . . For any such sequence x of this form, d
2(x) = 0y10y2 . . . ,
so the outcome of Ed with seed x is precisely y1, and the new seed x
(1) = d2(x) =
0y10y2 . . . . Similarly, for all i, starting with the seed x
(0) = x, the outcome of the
ith repetition is precisely yi, since a minimum number of k = 2 applications of
d suffices for the first bit of d2(x(i−1)) to be 0, and the seed after this repetition
is precisely x(i) = 0yi0yi+1 . . . . Hence, starting with the seed x one obtains the
infinite sequence y by repeating Ed to infinity. In particular, since y can be any
sequence at all, one can obtain both computable and incomputable sequences
by repeating Ed.
Let us show also that Ed is unpredictable. Let us assume, for the sake of
contradiction, that there exists a predictor PEd and extractor ξd such that PEd
is correct for ξd. Then PEd must give infinitely many correct predictions using
ξd for any two runs λ1λ2 . . . and λ
′
1λ
′
2 . . . which differ only in their seeds x and
x′. In particular, this is true if x,x′ are sequences of the form 0a1a2 . . . where
ai ∈ {1
t00, 1t01} for all i, and t ≥ 1 is fixed, since these are possible seeds for
Ed. For such seeds x,x
′ the minimum k ≥ 2 such that the first bit of dk(x) is
0 is precisely k = t+ 1. Furthermore, if we let x(0) = x and x(i) = dki
(
x(i−1)
)
be the seed for the ith repetition of Ed, then ki = t + 1 for all i; that is, each
iteration of Ed shifts the seed precisely t+1 bits. Thus, to make infinitely many
predictions for Ed starting with seeds x and x
′ correctly, PE must have access,
via ξd, to more than t + 3 bits of the current seed, since the first t + 2 bits of
x(i) and x′(i) are the same for all i. However, since t is arbitrary, and the same
extractor ξd must be used for all repetitions regardless of the seed, this implies
that ξd is arbitrarily accurate, which it is, again, not unreasonable to assume to
be physically impossible. Consequently, Ed must be unpredictable.
The construction of Ed may be slightly artificial and its unpredictability re-
lies, of course, on certain physical assumptions about the possibility of certain
extractors. However, this concrete example shows that there is no mathemat-
ical obstacle to an unpredictable experiment producing both computable and
incomputable outcomes when repeated, and is, at the very least, physically con-
ceivable.
Any link between the unpredictability of an experiment and computability
theoretic properties of its output thus relies critically on physical properties—
and assumptions—of the particular experiment. Indeed, this careful dependance
on the particular physical description of E is one of the strengths of this
general model. This gives the model more physical relevance as a notion of
(un)predictability than purely algorithmic proposals.
The bi-immunity of quantum randomness is a crucial illustration of this
fact. Using a slightly a stronger additional hypothesis on the nature of value
(in)definiteness, bi-immunity can be guaranteed for every sequence of quantum
random bits obtained by measuring a value indefinite observable [1]. For this
particular quantum experiment bi-immunity complements, and is independent
of, unpredictability.7
7 Summary
In this paper, we addressed two specific points relating to physical unpredictabil-
ity. Firstly, we developed a generalised model of prediction for both individual
physical events, and (by extension) infinite repetitions thereof. This model for-
malises the notion of an effective prediction agent being able to predict ‘in prin-
ciple’ the outcome of an effectively specified physical experiment. This model
can be applied to classical or quantum systems of any kind to assess their
(un)predictability, and doing so to various systems, particularly classical, could
be an interesting direction of research for the future.
Secondly, we applied this model to quantum measurement events. Our goal
was to formally deduce the unpredictability of single quantum measurement
events, via the strong Kochen-Specker theorem and value indefiniteness, rather
than rely on the ad hoc postulation of these properties.
More specifically, suppose that we prepare a quantum in a pure state corre-
sponding to a unit vector in Hilbert space of dimension at least three. Then any
complementary observable property of this quantum—corresponding to some
projector whose respective linear subspace is neither collinear nor orthogonal
with respect to the pure state vector—is value indefinite. Furthermore, the out-
come of a measurement of such a property is unpredictable with respect to our
model of prediction.
Quantum value indefiniteness is key for the proof of unpredictability. In this
framework, the bit resulting from the measurement of such an observable prop-
erty is “created from nowhere” (creatio ex nihilo), and cannot be causally con-
nected to any physical entity, whether it be knowable in practice or hidden.
While quantum indeterminism is often informally treated as an assumption in
and of itself, it is better seen as a formal consequence of Kochen-Specker theo-
rems in the form of value indefiniteness. (Indeed, without these theorems such
an assumption would appear weakly grounded.) Yet this derivation of value in-
definiteness rests on the three assumptions: admissibility, non-contextuality, and
the eigenstate principle. As we discussed in Sect. 5.3, models in which some of
these assumptions are not satisfied exist.
The single-bit unpredictability of the output obtained by measuring a value
indefinite quantum observable complements the fact—proven in [1] with an ad-
ditional hypothesis—that such an experiment generates, in the limit, a strongly
incomputable sequence. We show that this additional hypothesis is necessary in
the sense that unpredictable experiments are, in general, capable of generating
both incomputable and computable infinite sequences.
The unpredictability and strong incomputability of these quantum measure-
ments “certify” the use of the corresponding quantum random number generator
7 Recall that bi-immunity need not imply unpredictability either.
for various computational tasks in cryptography and elsewhere [26,24,19]. As a
consequence, this quantum random number generator can be seen and used
as an incomputable oracle, thus justifying a form of hypercomputation. Indeed,
no universal Turing machine can ever produce in the limit an output that is
identical with the sequence of bits generated by this quantum oracle [2]. More
than that—no single bit of such sequences can ever be predicted. Evaluating
the computational power of a (universal) Turing machine provided with a quan-
tum random oracle certified by maximum unpredictability is a challenging, both
theoretical and practical, open problem.
In this context incomputability appears maximally in two forms: individu-
alised—no single bit can be predicted with certainty (Theorem 3); that is, an
algorithmic computation of a single bit, even if correct, cannot be formally certi-
fied; and, relative to slightly stronger hypotheses, asymptotic via bi-immunity—
only finitely many bits can be correctly predicted via an algorithmic computa-
tion.
Finally, we emphasise that the indeterminism and unpredictability of quan-
tum measurement outcomes proved in this paper are based on the strong form of
the Kochen-Specker theorem, and hence require at minimum three-dimensional
Hilbert space. The question of whether this result can also be proven for two-
dimensional Hilbert space without simply assuming value indefiniteness is an
open problem; this question is important not only theoretically, but also prac-
tically, because many current quantum random generators are based on two-
dimensional measurements.
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